

Public Lecture

Introduction

In my dissertation I discuss how Romans promoted their translations and themselves through programmatic statements that advertise a particular relationship with a source author or text, whether it be one of faithfulness and fidelity, or of freedom and independence. These statements are often aimed at members of the audience who are familiar with the source text. I downplay the type of translation-analysis that relies on setting a translation side-by-side with a text in order to determine whether a translation is (literal) or *ad uerbum* or (free) that is, *ad sensum*. The application of these titles are problematic: for one, the titles obscure all of the possibilities of translation, instead promoting the notion that all translations can be divided into one of two camps. Moreover, the terms *ad uerbum* and *ad sensum* have forever been influenced by the history of Christian translation. Finally, these terms are subjective to the reader. Many years ago, at a University far away, I was tasked with translating four sight passages into English. My only guiding principle was that the English should replicate a style of a translation that would fall between a Loeb and a Penguin edition. Perhaps as a sign of my future questions about our vocabulary of translation, I failed the test. As anyone with a training in Classical Studies can attest, there are many different terms for translations. Close, word for word, literal, or, on the other end of the spectrum, loose, free, imitation. Or, floating somewhere in there, translationese. My complaint with these terms is that they bring to mind a certain style of translation to each individual and have little substance. How many words must one translate in a row before the translation can be called literal? We may all have ideas about what these words mean, but they are our ideas, rooted in our own experience. Therefore, I adopt the modern translator Douglas

Robinson's terminology in saying that our ideas about translation are based on feel. That is, we feel literal and loose translations; we know one when we see one. And it is by feel that we accept a work as a translation.

Part of my project entails understanding why *we* feel the way that we do about translations and determining how our feeling guides our acceptance of translations. Translation is far from an automatic, objective practice that should only result in a duplication of the original text; the translator is, after all, a human intermediary between texts. Often, when translating a passage in an exam scenario I have been tempted to depart from the script: I know what the author means, even if he does not exactly say so in the very words of the text. But I stop myself from writing what he means, instead keeping to what he says. Perhaps if I am feeling bold, I write in brackets the thing that I know that he means, but does not quite say. If I do not restrain myself, I am given back a paper with squiggly red lines underneath the offending text! In light of the negative consequences of my freedom, I have trained myself to adopt a more restrained manner when translating in an exam scenario.

Professional translators describe similar feelings of restraint. The aforementioned Douglas Robinson attests that, at times when he is translating chainsaw manuals, he has moods where he feels that he would rather be flashy than accurate. Yet, needing to be paid, he does not follow the urge to be flashy. Again, factors external to the translator determine the style of the translation and compel the translator to submit to the source. Although having to serve the source when translating ancient sources in exams or chainsaw manuals, is a minor burden, Robinson offers an example of translator restraint that should be more problematic: what if, he asks, the translator must translate something that he or she finds particularly obnoxious? Is the translator to mindlessly copy the original and spread the offending text? As Robinson argues, the traditional

training of the translator insists that even in these scenarios, the translator must submit to the original and become a voiceless agent through which the source speaks. Indeed, a voiceless, or invisible translator is the ideal translator among some modern circles: The award winning translator Norman Shapiro, for example, says that “I see translation as the attempt to produce a text so transparent that it does not seem to be translated. A good translation is like a pane of glass. You only notice that it’s there when there are little imperfections—scratches, bubbles. Ideally, there shouldn’t be any. It should never call attention to itself” For Shapiro, and those who gave him the award, the goal of a translation is to provide the source author with a new audience with minimal interference from the translator. By doing so, the translator hopes to offer a translation that is equivalent to the source.

History

The lofty ideal of equivalence, paired with a minimal trace of the translator in the text, is largely a product of early Christian Scripture and Biblical translation, wherein translation was complicated by the fact that the Christian God was the source author. Not only is God all-knowing, but he is also Universal, existing without borders. As He is universal, so too might be his message. That is, since the message comes from God, who knows no boundaries, could it not also exist across the boundaries that languages create? As part of this interpretation, God’s message would be greater than the words that contain it. In his work *On Christian Doctrine*, Augustine describes his concept of language and words that every subsequent translator in the West had to respond to, and still underlies much modern thinking about translation. Augustine believed that words were representatives of truths that were universal among humans and divine. He equates the Word of God entering the mortal body of Jesus with thought entering the word; the immortal is set inside the mortal, but the immortal portion does not itself undergo any

alteration. The word is changeable; the sense is not. Perfect translation is then a process of breaking through the word to the Universal meaning. What further complicated the matter of translation here was that few translators wished to claim mastery over a message from God. Who could claim to understand the mind of God, which is unknowable to the mortal? Translators had to negotiate the situation wherein the source was always superior, changes to the text could result in charges of heresy, but perfect translation was held out as a possibility. They did so by promoting their particular styles of translation as avenues to the Truth of the source while couching their statements in self-deprecating tones. St. Jerome, a contemporary of Augustine who favoured *ad sensum* translation that, like a conquering hero brought the source text back to the target audience as its captive, was careful to remind his addressee in a *private letter* that he always translated Holy Scripture word-for-word = because, as he claims, the sense of the original is a mystery to him, and thus the only way he might access the message is by following the words.

Likewise when Boethius translated Aristotle in the sixth century, he insisted that each word of the original be preserved so that he could show his readers the unsullied truth of Aristotle. Boethius and Church translators who claim to translate in a literal style promote themselves as the willing servant who provide the truth of the source with a minimum of interference from the translator.

The support of literal translation gives rise to those who would advocate a different approach. As Jerome, (et al) had taken positions as literal translators, claiming that their method was the way to the truth, *ad sensum* translators argued that the most important part of the source was the message, not the words. As a part of this movement, some translators looked to a wide audience who may not be familiar with the source: this stance is visible in the writings of Martin

Luther, who derides his critics who want him to translate in a style of German that no German would understand. Indeed, Luther's writes as if he will circumvent the judgment of the learned audience as he tries to reach a broader audience. Luther is hostile to his critics, writing that he is as learned as any of them, and who are they to argue with him over translation choices? He assumes a higher status for the translator than earlier Church translators, and the form of translation that he promotes reaffirms this: Luther prefers *ad sensum* translation, but to translate the sense indicates that he understands the message. *Ad sensum* advocates support the notion that translators are able to make decisions in regard to what the source audience *needs* to hear: Jean Chapelain, a 17th century French poet, says that it is up to the translator to show only what is pleasing and useful to the audience. Translators claim this ability to make these decision on the basis of a deep familiarity with the source text and its circumstances.

The notion that the translator can become intimately familiar with a source text, and even a source author, is the principal of a group of translators called imitators, which is a form of translation that binds the translator neither to word nor message. The French poet Joachim du Bellay writes that imitation is the result of a close, symbiotic relationship between the translator and the source as he describes the imitator transforming himself into the source author by "devouring" the original work. Imitators promise that this relationship results in a translation that does not reproduce words or even meaning, but one that recaptures the very experience of the source text in its original presentation. Historically, imitation has been cast as something outside of translation: Neitsche argued that Romans, for instance, did not translate, but imitated. That they did so was defensible since by imitating they were breathing their souls into the dead body that was the source material. By bringing life to the text and positioning the experience as essential, imitators endeavor to displace both *ad uerbum* and *ad sensum* translators. All

translators, *ad uerbum*, *ad sensum*, imitators, promise that they are recreating some particular aspect of the source that they present as the most important part. That is, they promote a piece of equivalence.

Yet do their claims reflect reality, or is equivalence itself only a word that promotes the translation? Indeed, Robinson refers to equivalence not as the final goal of translation, but as only a fiction that is useful when shaping a text. Equivalence goes well with Augustine's notions of words and meaning, but we need not agree with Augustine. As an opposing view, the modern scholar Willard Van Orman Quine argues that the meaning and value of words are prescribed by each culture; each new receiving (or translating) culture rewrites the text according to its own values. Meaning is dependent upon language for Quine; unlike Augustine's understanding of meaning as a universality set by God, meaning does not exist outside of the way in which it is described. If meaning exists not in an eternal realm where it lies unchanged, but instead in the mind of every person who is influenced by his or her own culture, then it is no longer useful to consider equivalence as the final goal of translation, since it is unachievable.

Once the role of equivalence is reduced, these claims of adherence to a particular style look like advertisements. When Jerome assures his addressee that he translates Holy Scripture in a literal style, he does so to depict himself as a devout follower and to avoid charges of heresy. When Luther claims that his way of translating is the surest experience of the Bible, he has not discovered a new style that has opened better avenues to an understanding of the source. Instead, he is promoting his translation over that of earlier and competing translations. How closely one translated the source is less important than the fact that the translator promotes a particular style in the first place. When a translator informs the audience about the choice, she reveals how she see her role as an intermediary between target audience and source. While we might be able to

derive similar information from examining the translation text itself side-by-side with the source text, we could never reach a firm decision since we would rely on our standards for literal and free translation: What one reader may consider a literal translation will be too free to another reader. Rather than applying our own standards on translations from the past, it is better to examine the statements of the translators in which they identify and promote their form translation, to ask the question why the translator has taken that stance, and thus hope to reveal some insights into the workings of the target literary culture of the period.

MY take

It is because of these reasons that I promote the statements of translators over the form of the translation. As I turn away from the form of the text, I am able to focus on the relationships that the translator forms among the participants of a translation, that is, the source, the translator, and the target audience. When a translator claims to be “imitating” a source author or work, I consider what type of relationship with the source author he is presenting to his target audience versus a translator who says that he writes *ad uerbum* translations. Moreover, I see the target-audience having greater authority in determining the proclaimed style of translation than what has traditionally been assigned.

Source-Representative

Using the relationship advertised as the determining factor, I have divided my examples of Roman translation into three categories: source-representative, allusive, and independent. The defining feature of the source-representative modality is the self-positioning by the translator as the faithful intermediary between source and target audience. The translator projects the

appearance that he is giving his audience unadulterated source material, with an implied minimal amount of translator intrusion on the translation.

Livius Andronicus' *Odusia* is illustrative of this form of translation. Andronicus was brought as a slave from Tarentum in the third century BCE to Rome where he served as a tutor before becoming a dramatist. His epic poem *Odusia*, a translation of Homer's *Odyssey* survives only in fragments, but what remains shows Andronicus staying close to the language and format of Homer's *Odyssey*.

In the first line of the work Andronicus announces that his text is a capable faithful representation of Homer's *Odyssey*. He opens his translation with the phrase *uirum mihi, Camena, insece uersutum* ("Tell me, Camena, of the wily man", fr. 1 Blänsdorf), which is a close rendering of Homer's opening line ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον. Andronicus preserves each element of the source in nearly the exact order that they appeared in the original: Notably, he even retains the sound of the original when he uses the rare word *insece* to translate Homer's *evvepe*. The Latin *insece* is archaic, and its unfamiliarity resists easy acceptance and reminds the audience of the Otherness of the text: it is the imperfection on the window of Shapiro. In this way the line is a pronouncement of fidelity to the source: Andronicus gives the illusion that Homer himself is writing the poem. Yet there is a degree of complexity in this line that signals to the reader that while Andronicus is a capable faithful translator, he is not mindless in his task. For while *Insece* looks back to the Greek source, the word *Camena* looks forward to Andronicus' Latin audience. By replacing Homer's Muses with the native water diety *Camena*, Andronicus turns toward his target audience in a symbolic gesture that shows the care and skill that he is devoting towards bringing Homer's epic text to a new Roman setting.

Thus it is here in the opening line that the poet makes his authorial statement. The closeness apparent is a programmatic advertisement to the reader that Livius Andronicus stands between Homer and his new Roman audience as a mindful intermediary who is capable of using all of Latin's vocabulary and Rome's cultural history to make his source relevant. In the symbolic sense, he is bringing Homer to those who lack Homer. Yet the actual translation indicates that readers who were unfamiliar with the source text were not his primary audience. The adherence to the form and content of the original demonstrates that Andronicus was aiming his translation at those who knew the Greek text and could appreciate a close translation when they saw one.

Allusive

Like the source-representative translator, the allusive translator associates himself with the source author. Unlike the source-representative translator, however, the allusive translator declares how he goes beyond the precedent set by the source. Catullus, for example, calls attention to the fact that translation alone cannot satisfy him. Indeed, Catullus presents translation as an activity of leisure, and encourages himself to cease translating as it is ultimately an inadequate tool of expression.

Catullus poem 51 is largely a faithful translation of a fragment of Sappho, but ends with a striking rebuke aimed simultaneously at Catullus the lover depicted and Catullus the poet. For the first twelve lines, Catullus' poem follows the Sapphic original. As Sappho did, Catullus views his love interest from across the room; both poets are taken aback at how well their lover's partner remains composed at the side of such a beauty. Catullus adheres to the Sappho poem in imagining that the partner must be a god or, at least equal to a god (*Ille mi par esse deo videtur*, 1

= φαίνεται μοι κῆνος ἴσος θεοῖσιν, 1). Catullus follows Sappho in describing the effect that the lover's beauty has on his person: the subject forcefully loses his perception (*eripit sensus*, 6) and his voice (*nihil est super mi/ uocis in ore/ lingua sed torpet*, 6-8 = ὥς με φώναι/-ς οὐδ' ἔν' ἔτ' εἴκει/ ἀλλὰ καὶ μὲν γλῶσσά <μ'> ἔαγε, 7-9); passion settles in under his limbs (*tenuis sub artus/ flamma demanat*, 9 - 10 = λέπτον / δ' αὖτ' ἄρα χροῖ πῦρ ὑπαδεδρόμηκεν, 9-10); and his eyes go dark (*gemina teguntur/ lumina nocte*, 11-12 = ὀπάτεσσι δ' οὐδ' ἔν' ὄρημι, 11).

However, Catullus suddenly breaks off the description of his love-sickness in the fourth stanza. By a self-address in the vocative in line 13, he cautions himself that *otium* is a problem for him (*otium, Catulle, tibi molestum est*, 13). He reproves himself with the censure of line 14 “too greatly do you delight and spend time in leisure” (*otio exsultas nimiumque gestis*). Catullus' Self-admonition subsequently becomes the theme of the remainder of the poem. No longer does Catullus follow the thread started by Sappho, but instead deviates into a conversation with himself, and not with the self as a lover, but as a poet. He ends with his warning in lines 15-16 that *otium* has the power to destroy even kings and blessed cities (*otium et reges prius et beatas / perdidit urbes*).

It is not immediately clear from the poem what risk *otium* presents to Catullus. The question that has stymied scholars is what this last stanza, and specifically the reference to *otium*, has to do with the rest of the poem. The fact that this is actually two questions further complicates the problem: namely, why does Catullus apparently stop translating Sappho and what relation do the sentiments expressed in the *otium* stanza have with the rest of the poem? I argue that in the final stanza, Catullus makes a forceful statement about how he defines himself as a poet. In the first three stanzas Catullus is not only displaying his persona in the relationship with Lesbia, but he is also, as the author of the poem, translating. As the poem progresses, the

audience is aware of Catullus the lover, depicted in the narrative, and Catullus the poet, here acting as translator. The fourth stanza marks the departure point not *only* from the narrative of his feelings for Lesbia, but even from the literary act of translating. This is the moment at which Catullus depicts himself ceasing from his translating and alters the direction of the poem so that he can comment upon what he has written. No longer is Catullus the poet writing about Catullus the lover, but rather Catullus the translator-poet. In this way, the mention of *otium* has little to do with the love and desire that Catullus feels for Lesbia, a popular explanation among scholars, but rather indicates that Catullus filled his *otium* with translating.

This reading of *otium* pairs well with the development of poem 50, which can be read as a companion piece to 51. The common theme of both concerns *otium*. As 50 opens with reference to the activities of *otium* (*hesterno, Licini, die otiosi*, 1), 51 likewise closes. On this reading, everything that falls between the opening of 50 and the finale of poem 51 is a part of Catullus' creation while at leisure. In 50, Catullus depicts himself and Licinius Calvus as writing poetry in a playful manner, never using vocabulary that would make us believe that "serious" poetry was being undertaken (*lusimus* [2]; *versiculos* [4]; *ludebat* [5]; *reddens mutua per iocum atque vinum* [6]). It is important to observe that the portion of 51 that is a translation falls between the two *otium* markers. When Catullus calls for himself to cease from *otium* and *otiosa*, he simultaneously ends his translation.

The problem that Catullus identifies in the final stanza of 51 is less that he may lose himself as a Roman male in his burning love for Lesbia, but rather that he may lose himself as a poet in his translating of Lesbian source material. The warning is the vehicle for Catullus' statement of independence and Catullus makes his pronouncement the original portion itself. Thereby Catullus makes the subject his own, and establishes his relationship with not only his

Lesbia, but with Greek literature as his source in general. The translation, then, serves as the platform for Catullus to show himself as a capable translator, one aware of the literary tradition of his poetry, but more importantly as a poet who is uninterested in using the tapestry from others to portray his emotions.

Cicero

The style of translation evident in Cicero's treatment of Greek philosophy differs from the allusive and the source-representative modalities in that Cicero undermines the authority of the source in the target culture in favour of his own self-promotion. In Cicero's texts, the explicit self-promotion is necessitated by critics who question the value of his translations since the sources are available. To alleviate the concerns of his critics Cicero regularly reminds his audience of his authoritative hand in the translation.

Cicero opens his treatise *de Finibus* by listing four points that his critics have leveled against him. All are concerned with how Cicero is misusing his time. Cicero lists the areas of censure one after the other (1.1):

Nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet philosophari. quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. Erunt etiam, et ii quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent.

For to certain people (and certainly these people are not entirely unlearned), philosophy is entirely displeasing. While there will be some who do not so much disapprove of it if it is pursued mildly, they do not think that much devotion and care should be placed into it. And there will be those (and certainly these people are learned in Greek letters and look down upon Latin), who say that they would rather spend their time in reading Greek.

Finally I suspect there will be others who call me to other literature, and deny that this type of writing, although it may be tasteful, is of my character and worth.

The four groups of critics are: those who disapprove of philosophy entirely; those who would see the study of philosophy limited; those who do not see a reason why Latin translations of philosophy need exist; those who want Cicero to write something other than philosophy.

The most problematic barrier for Cicero the translator is the third point that he depicts, namely that there are those who are learned in Greek and who deny the value of having Greek texts in Latin. To dispute the first, second, and fourth objection Cicero needs to show to those who either do not approve of or would limit philosophical inquiry why the study of philosophy is valuable. Cicero does not devote much time to proving this point in any one of his philosophical translations; many members of his learned audience, such as Varro, Atticus, and Brutus are already familiar with the benefits of philosophy. The third objection is more complicated because it demands that Cicero show how a Roman, and Cicero in particular, can benefit the target culture by translating Greek philosophy. His audience already knows the value of philosophy; but they see no reason to have in Latin what is already available in Greek. Varro in Cicero's *Academica* serves as a mouthpiece for the notion that a translation is impractical and a waste of time (1.2.8):

nam cum philosophiam uiderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimaui si qui de nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca potius quam nostra lecturos, sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca intellegi non possunt. itaque ea nolui scribere quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent.

For when I saw philosophy set out most carefully in Greek literature, I decided that if some Romans were possessed by zeal for philosophy, if they were learned in Greek they would rather read the Greeks than us, but if they shrank away from the Greek arts and education, they would care not even for those, since Greek things cannot be understood

without learning. And thus I did not want to write that which the unlearned could not understand nor what the learned did not care to read.

In contrast, Cicero believes that a successful translation could replace the source: an achievement that he credits to other Romans in select instances: in the *Academica* Cicero compliments Brutus on having translated so well that he rendered the source worthless (*Ac.* 1.2.12). After Piso completes his speech on the tenets of the Academy in *De Finibus* Cicero compliments him on the proficient translation: Cicero declares (5.75) that if Piso could give more lectures of this sort then the Romans would have less need of the Greeks. In *Tusculanae Disputationes* (2.6), Cicero expresses his hope that once philosophical studies are transferred to the Romans there will be no need for Greek libraries; If Cicero's texts are to replace the Greek sources, those who know both must choose the Latin over the Greek. It is the learned members of the audience who can prevent the Latin translations from replacing the source by refusing to stop using the source. To convince the learned audience that his work will be a valuable replacement, Cicero must propose an additional benefit to the translation beyond the fact that there will be books on philosophy written in Latin. The translation must be better than the source, either by the strength of the translator or the weakness of the source.

To show how he is improving the source, Cicero clearly points out how he will translate. Cicero does not make claims that he will be cautious in preserving the style or substance of the source. The only position he takes is that he will mediate the source information, preserving what he approves, discounting what he disagrees with. In *de Finibus* he outlines what his concept of translation entails (*Fin.* 1.6):

Quid si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus? quid

habent cur Graeca anteponant iis quae et splendide dicta sint neque sint conuersa de Graecis?

But what if we do not perform the service of interpreters, but protect those things which have been said by those men whom we approve of, and add to those things our judgment and arrangement of writing? What reasons do those critics have for preferring the Greek texts before those which are well-styled and not simple reproductions from the Greek sources?

He makes a statement that looks to a similar method in the *De Officiis* (1.6) when he explains which philosophical school he will follow:

Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo uidebitur, hauriemus.

Therefore, at this time and in this investigation we will follow primarily the Stoics, not as interpreters, but, as we are accustomed, we will drink from their fountain according to my own judgment and choice, as much and in what way as seems proper.

These proclamations at the opening of two different philosophical treatises establish that Cicero will translate the information that he identifies as appropriate for his audience, even changing the style and arrangement of the original if Cicero finds it unfitting.. He will present his target audience something better than what they could find on their own were they to read the source, as he assumes the role of editor over this source material. In some aspects, Cicero is not assuming more than is regular for a translator: all translators perform some kind of editorial function in the process of translation, even if it is only at the level of linguistic structure. Yet Cicero differentiates himself from customary practices by being explicit about his authoritative role and promoting the application of his judgment as the benefit of his translation. By emphasizing his role at the outset, Cicero establishes why he is the ideal Roman translator of Greek philosophy. His active involvement promises that his audience will experience philosophy in a meaningful and understandable manner.

In the portion of his treatises that the translation occupies, Cicero reinforces the active role he is taking in translation by showing how carefully he is translating Greek philosophical terminology and pointing out times when the Greeks are unable to be as precise as he, a Roman, is. In book 3 of *de Finibus*, Cicero finds Cato sitting amongst a pile of books on Stoicism in the library of Lucullus. At Cicero's request, Cato agrees to expound on Stoicism. Throughout the monologue, Cicero's character Cato pauses the discussion to announce what Greek word he is translating, and why he is translating it the way he is. The translator is nowhere as visible in the Roman practice as in these instances. In one instance Cato pauses the discussion to explain what he means by the term *perturbationes animorum* (*Fin.* 3.35).

Nec uero perturbationes animorum, quae uitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt, quas Graeci πάθη appellant – poteram ego uerbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conueniret ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt πάθος (*Fin.* 3.35)

Nor indeed the disturbances of the mind, which makes the life of the foolish miserable and harsh, and what the Greeks call πάθη – interpreting the word itself, I could call them diseases, but that does not fit all uses; for who usually calls pity or anger itself a “disease”? But yet the Greeks call them πάθη

He discloses that he is translating the Greek term πάθη. He points out that he *could* translate the term with *morbi*, but the Latin term does not convey all possible meanings of πάθη (*sed non conueniret ad omnia*). People do not usually call pity and anger *morbi*, Cato explains. By showing how he reached his conclusion, Cicero invites the audience to agree with his translation and approve his methodology. Furthermore, Cicero the author displays his understanding of the finer points of the Latin language and shows why *his* translation, as opposed to another Roman's, will be the superior version. Others will translate πάθη as *morbi*, but they will be wrong.

But note that Cicero's criticism has two objects in this passage. Poor translators will translate *pathe* as *morbi*, and by doing so will include pity and anger under the title *morbi*. The Greeks, Cicero says, do this as well: where the Romans have a term to identify mental illness and one for bodily illness, the Greeks group them all together under *pathe*. Cicero is pointing out that the Greeks are less precise in their language than he is. He makes the same point in the *Tusculan Disputations* (*Tusc.* 2.35) when he concedes that Greek is richer, though perhaps not as copious as the Greeks would claim.

haec duo Graeci illi, quorum copiosior est lingua quam nostra, uno nomine appellant. itaque industrios homines illi studiosos uel potius amantis doloris appellant, nos commodius laboriosos: aliud est enim laborare, aliud dolere. o uerborum inops interdum, quibus abundare te semper putas, Graecia! aliud, inquam, est dolere, aliud laborare.

These two things (toil and pain) the Greeks, whose language is richer than ours, give one name. Thus they call diligent men devotees, or rather, lovers of pain, but we more fittingly call them toilers: for it is one thing to toil, another to feel pain. Oh Greece, how you sometimes are lacking in words in which you always think that you have an abundance!

(everyone is now thinking how wrong Cicero is here). Cicero explains not only why competing Latin translations are inferior to his work, but even why the Greek originals are faulty and how his version is superior to the source: his translation offers a degree of precision that the Greeks could not match.

Cicero is careful throughout his philosophical translations to ensure that it is his voice that is most prominent. In both instances the translation is paused so that Cicero can show the background to the act of translating, and in the process the focus of the passage switches from the Stoic sources to Cicero the translator. That is, the attention is on how Cicero will translate *pathe*, not what the Stoics have to say about it. Beyond inviting the reader to approve Cicero's

work, showing his work also reminds the reader that he is not reading a Greek source, but Cicero's mediation of that source. I should point out that a translator who was trying to be invisible, like Norman Shapiro from before, would do well not to call attention to the fact that his voice is not the voice of the source author; it is distracting and reminds the reader of the gap between target and source culture. Yet this distraction is the very thing that Cicero seeks: Cicero's primary goal is, far from equivalence, to reinforce how different his translation is from the source text. Cicero is advertising *his* work, not that of the source.

Conclusion

The programmatic statements made by the translators indicate how they advertise themselves and their work. Some authors position themselves as adherents to the source model; others separate themselves from the source, marketing themselves as the authoritative figure in the literary genre of the translation. These statements are promotional remarks made by the translator in response to circumstances in the socio-literary conditions of the target literary system.

My analysis of Roman translation thus moves away from the traditional view that translations exist only to serve a source. Since the time of Augustine the notion that words in different languages are representative of universals has pervaded translation practice and theory, resulting in the belief that a "perfect" or "true" translation is a possibility. The search for the perfect translation led to a focus on the form of translations, particularly *ad uerbum* and *ad sensum* forms, and whether or not the translator had "succeeded" in recreating the source text. Since there is no universal agreement on how best to recreate a source text, post-Classical translators have traditionally promoted their adherence to one form or the other as a part of their method of showing the target audience the "truth" of the source text; *ad uerbum* translators

argued that by recreating even the words of the source text they were bringing their audience as close as possible to the experience of reading the foreign text; *ad sensum* translators, meanwhile, asserted that their translations privileged the message of the source author, which they claimed was the important part of the source. In either instance, however, the translators were identifying the desires of their target audiences.

Similarly, Roman translators created translations that promoted themselves in the target audience. Livius Andronicus presents his *Oduvia* as an accurate representation of Homer's *Odyssey* when he translates the first line as closely as possible to the source text, even mirroring the sound of the Greek words. Livius' translation here is programmatic, since it publicizes the notion that the fidelity achieved here will be mirrored throughout the text. For Livius, fidelity to Homer was a marketable ability that appealed to people who sought Homer's *Odyssey* in Latin.

Catullus renounces the practice of translation when he abruptly ceases the translation of Sappho's original in c. 51. The change in the poem's direction calls attention towards Catullus the poet: translation, he declares, is a leisurely activity that does not match his perception of what his poetry should be. He urges himself away from translating the work of others towards original creation; Sappho's depiction of her relationship with her lover is inadequate for describing his affair with Lesbia.

Cicero's independent translation shows familiarity with the source, as well as his own originality, but ultimately proves Cicero's superiority to the source as he advertises his translations as replacements of the source texts in the Latin literary system. Cicero prefaces his translations by announcing that his judgment, which the source texts were obviously lacking, will play the deciding role in what he actually translates; he is clear that he is no passive agent that allows all of the source text to pass through him into the translation. To support his claim he

regularly shows what he is translating and how he reached the translation conclusion that he did. Cicero positions his translation over a reading of the source text, and certainly over the translations that another, less skilled Roman would offer.

All of the insights that emerge from weighing the translator's own words are lost when we apply the titles *ad sensum* or *ad uerbum*, terms that mean more to us in our heritage of Western thought than they did to Republican Romans. An examination of translations on the fabricated basis of how closely we perceive the translator stayed to the source obscures how the translator situates himself in his literary system. Indeed, by focusing on adherence we come dangerously close to eliminating the agency of the translator, as if the role of the translator is to render source text into translation in a mechanical fashion. By focusing on the form of the text and judging how well it represents the source, we suppose that a "perfect translation" is possible, if only the translator could perfectly understand the words and the message of the source author. In reality, the final format of a translation is the product of both implicit and explicit influences from the socio-literary conditions and also the result of numberless decisions made by the translator that are representative of his or her own ideals about translation. By calling a translation "literal" or "loose" we obscure the negotiations that the translator must have while translating. To gain a proper appreciation of how translators see their role in a literary society, we must promote their voices and acknowledge that what they have written is a reflection of them and their perceived audience.

The Modalities of Roman Translation: Source-representative, Allusive, and Independent.

JAMES KRUCK

Livius Andronicus, fr. 1 (Blänsdorf)

uirum mihi, Camena, insece uersutum

Homer, *Odyssey* 1.1

ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον (Od. 1.1)

Sappho, fr. 31 (Voigt)	Catullus 51 (Thomson)	Catullus 51
<p>φαίνεται μοι κῆνος ἴσος θεοῖσιν ἔμμεν' ὦνηρ, ὅττις ἐνάντιός τοι ἰσδάνει καὶ πλάσιον ἄδυ φωνεί- σας ὑπακούει</p> <p>καὶ γελαίσας ἰμέροεν, τό μ' ἦ μὰν (5) καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόαισεν, ὥς γὰρ <ἔς> σ' ἴδω βρόχε' ὥς με φώνη- σ' οὐδὲν ἔτ' εἴκει,</p> <p>ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν γλῶσσα τ' ἔαγετ', λέπτον δ' αὖτις χροῖ πῦρ ὑπαδεδρομάκεν, (10) ὁππάτεσσι δ' οὐδὲν ὄρημ', ἐπιβρό- μβεισι δ' ἄκουαι,</p> <p>τέκαδε μ' ἰδρῶς κακχέεται, τρόμος δὲ παῖσαν ἄγρει, χλωροτὲ ἔρα δὲ πλοῖας ἔμμι, τεθλὲ νάκην δ' ὀλίγω 'πιδελ' ὕης (15) φα λῖνομ' ἔμ' αὖται·</p> <p>ἀλλὰ πὰν τόλματον, ἐπεὶ τὰ καὶ πένητατ</p>	<p><i>Ille mi par esse deo videtur, ille, si fas est, superare divos, qui sedens adversus identidem te spectat et audit</i></p> <p><i>dulce ridentem, misero quod omnis (5) eripit sensus mihi: nam simul te, Lesbia, aspexi, nihil est super mi <vocis in ore></i></p> <p><i>lingua sed torpet, tenuis sub artus (10) flamma demanat, sonitu suo tintinant aures, gemina teguntur lumina nocte.</i></p> <p><i>Otium, Catulle, tibi molestum est: otio exsultas nimiumque gestis; otium et reges prius et beatas (15) perdidit urbes.</i></p>	<p>He seems to me to be equal to a god, that man, if it is lawful, seems to be above the gods, he who, sitting opposite of you, repeatedly looks and listens to you</p> <p>laughing sweetly, which snatches all sense from miserable me: for when I look upon you, Lesbia, nothing is left of my voice in my mouth</p> <p>but my tongue lies numb, a thin flame runs through my limbs, my ears ring with a sweet sound, and my eyes are covered with night.</p> <p>Leisure, Catullus, is a nuisance for you: you enjoy and spend too much time in leisure: leisure has destroyed earlier kings and blessed cities.</p>

Catullus, 50.1-2

*Hesterno, Licini, die otiosi
multum lusimus in meis tabellis*

Yesterday, Licinius, while at leisure,
we played much on my writing tablets

Nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet philosophari. quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. Erunt etiam, et ii quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemnentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent. (Fin. 1.1)

For to certain people (and certainly these people are not entirely unlearned), philosophy is entirely displeasing. While there will be some who do not so much disapprove of it if it is pursued mildly, they do not think that much devotion and care should be placed into it. And there will be those (and certainly these people are learned in Greek letters and look down upon Latin), who say that they would rather spend their time in reading Greek. Finally I suspect there will be others who call me to other literature, and deny that this type of writing, although it may be tasteful, is of my character and worth.

Nam cum philosophiam uiderem diligentissime Graecis litteris explicatam, existimaui si qui de nostris eius studio tenerentur, si essent Graecis doctrinis eruditi, Graeca potius quam nostra lecturos, sin a Graecorum artibus et disciplinis abhorrerent, ne haec quidem curaturos, quae sine eruditione Graeca intellegi non possunt. itaque ea nolui scribere quae nec indocti intellegere possent nec docti legere curarent. (Ac. 1.2.8)

For when I saw philosophy set out most carefully in Greek literature, I decided that if some Romans were possessed by zeal for philosophy, if they were learned in Greek they would rather read the Greeks than us, but if they shrank away from the Greek arts and education, they would care not even for those, since Greek things cannot be understood without learning. And thus I did not want to write that which the unlearned could not understand nor what the learned did not care to read.

Quid si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus? quid habent cur Graeca anteponant iis quae et splendide dicta sint neque sint conuersa de Graecis? (Fin. 1.6)

But what if we do not perform the service of interpreters, but protect those things which have been said by those men whom we approve of, and add to those things our judgment and arrangement of writing? What reasons do those critics have for preferring the Greek texts before those which are well-styled and not simple reproductions from the Greek sources?

Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo uidebitur, hauriemus.
(Off. 1.6)

Therefore, at this time and in this investigation we will follow primarily the Stoics, not as interpreters, but, as we are accustomed, we will drink from their fountain according to my own judgment and choice, as much and in what way as seems proper.

Nec uero perturbationes animorum, quae uitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt, quas Graeci πάθη appellant – poteram ego uerbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conueniret ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt πάθος (Fin. 3.35)

Nor indeed the disturbances of the mind, which makes the life of the foolish miserable and harsh, and what the Greeks call πάθη – interpreting the word itself, I could call them diseases, but that does not fit all uses; for who usually calls pity or anger itself a “disease”? But yet the Greeks call them πάθη

Haec duo Graeci illi, quorum copiosior est lingua quam nostra, uno nomine appellant. itaque industrios homines illi studiosos uel potius amantis doloris appellant, nos commodius laboriosos: aliud est enim laborare, aliud dolere. o uerborum inops interdum, quibus abundare te semper putas, Graecia! aliud, inquam, est dolere, aliud laborare. (Tusc. 2.35)

These two things (toil and pain) the Greeks, whose language is richer than ours, give one name. Thus they call diligent men devotees, or rather, lovers of pain, but we more fittingly call them toilers: for it is one thing to toil, another to feel pain. Oh Greece, how you sometimes are lacking in words in which you always think that you have an abundance!

